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Local Institutions, Foreign Investment and
Alternative Strategies of Development: Some
Views from Practice
TAMARA LOTHIAN AND KATHARINA PISTOR
This Essay summarizes the major insights gained from
a panel discussion with legal practitioners about the
relevance of local institutions to foreign direct
investors. The Essay offers a critique of policy
conclusions drawn from empirical studies that suggest
a positive correlation between legal institutions and
foreign investment flows. It points out that the data
used in these studies are far too general to allow
policy conclusions and that neither the data nor the
policy conclusions are sufficiently attuned to the
challenges or opportunities that foreign direct
investment projects face on the ground. According to
the results of the panel discussion, greater emphasis
should be placed on the diversity of institutions that
may support different investment projects and the local
conditions and constituencies that are necessary for
successful investment projects.
I. INTRODUCTION
Law matters for economic development, particularly for
foreign direct investment. This statement forms part of the core
consensus among policy advisors of developing countries, emerging
markets, and transition economies. According to this new consensus,
law plays a crucial role in the process of market-oriented
development. The function of law is twofold: to define and enforce
Tamara Lothian is a Principal of the International Strategies Group and Lecturer in
Law, Columbia Law School; Katharina Pistor is an Associate Professor of Law, Columbia
Law School.
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private rights, especially the rights of foreign investors, and to create
the legal foundations for market-oriented reform, which alone can
guarantee the basis for economic development, stability, and growth.
The statement that "law matters" is not entirely new. It
figured prominently in the first law and development movement in the
1960s. This movement, however, came to a halt when financial
resources dried up and the leading protagonists of the movement
realized how little was known about law and legal institutions,
particularly when and how they matter for socioeconomic
development.1
However, in recent years, this vision of law has emerged again
and spread increasingly around the world. Multilateral and bilateral
aid institutions, including the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund ("IMF"), and the United States Agency for International
Development ("USAID"), have spearheaded new "law and
development" projects for countries in transition, emerging markets,
and economies gripped by economic crisis. In addition, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD")
has developed codes of conduct based on corporate law for member
states and transition economies, which are said to represent "best
practices."2  Once adopted and implemented by the law-receiving
countries, these codes supposedly will foster economic development
and growth.
Part II of this Essay offers a critique of the far-reaching policy
conclusions drawn from recent empirical studies. Part III explains the
motivation for using a panel discussion with practitioners to elicit new
information and insights. Part IV summarizes the lessons learned
from actual experience of practitioners involved in foreign investment
projects. Part V sketches an agenda for future research on foreign
direct investment and local institutions.
1. David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L.
REV. 1062; John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins,
Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457
(1977). For a critique of the critics of the first law and development movement, however, see
Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 470
(1995).
2. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (1999), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/50/4347646.pdf.
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II. IMPERFECT DATA AND POLICY CONCLUSIONS
Today there is much more empirical support for the claim that
law matters for foreign investment. Nevertheless, new law and
development initiatives that use these data to buttress their agenda are
as problematic today as they were in the early 1960s. There are three
main problems: (A) the data are poorly specified; (B) the concepts are
incoherent; and (C) the promise of new reforms is rarely realized in
practice. This Essay addresses these three problems in turn.
A. The Data Are Poorly Specified
The growing faith in the relevance of legal institutions relies,
to some extent, on cross-country studies showing that institutional
variables are statistically significant for promoting growth, trade, and
foreign investment.3 Most of these studies use cross-country data that
capture the perceptions of interviewees (most of them foreign
investors) regarding the "quality of legal institutions" on a given
scale, where ten stands for "very good" and zero stands for "poor."
These data typically identify only a few institutions. For example, the
"efficiency" of the judiciary is frequently singled out. In addition,
interviewees are asked about the scale of expropriation or contract
repudiation by the government, the severity of corruption, and a
general commitment to the rule of law.4 Several studies also employ
indicators for statutory law, but for many countries the available data
address only a limited area of shareholder and creditor rights
protection.5
B. The Concepts Are Incoherent
These studies suggest that countries with "better" legal
institutions perform better economically. At the same time, however,
3. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-
Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL. 207 (1995); Paolo
Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681 (1995); Shang-Jin Wei, How Taxing is
Corruption on International Investors?, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1 (2000); James Anderson &
Douglas Marcouiller, Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: An Empirical Investigation, 84
REV. ECON. & STAT. 342 (2001).
4. See Knack & Keefer, supra note 3. The authors developed the most widely used
database on the basis of country risk assessments conducted by private consulting groups.
5. See Rafeal La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998).
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these studies treat legal institutions as a black box. There is little
conceptual clarity about what is meant by an "efficient judiciary,"
much less an account of the possibility that interviewees may have
different understandings about what makes a judiciary "efficient." Is
it speed, fairness, legality of conflict resolution, or something else?
Furthermore, while the absence of government expropriation may be
considered an obvious case, "expropriation" may come in many
forms, including regulatory takings, some of which may be regarded
as enhancing social welfare, even if they are disliked by the foreign
investment community.
Another reason to question the mantra that legal reforms will
benefit economic growth and development is that the policy
conclusion rests on data that have little diagnostic or therapeutic
power. Available information fails to elaborate on which institutions
might be dysfunctional or what might cause their troubles. Moreover,
they ignore the possibility that countries may have developed
alternative mechanisms to resolve issues believed to be addressed by
formal legal institutions in developed market economies.6 Finally,
policy conclusions derived from the data disregard the possibility that
foreign investors have developed their own strategies to address their
basic needs. These strategies may build on existing formal
institutions, but may go far beyond them, even in countries with
developed legal institutions.
C. The Promise of the New Reforms Is Rarely Realized in
Practice
The difficulties of the earlier movement led its erstwhile
proponents to sound the death knell of the first law and development
movement.7 Recent findings show that legal reforms that rely
extensively on legal transplants do not necessarily promote effective
legal institutions. As measured by the perception indices described
above, countries that receive their law primarily from external sources
by way of transplant tend to have inferior legal institutions, unless the
countries take an active stance in adapting the transplanted law to
domestic conditions or are otherwise familiar with it.8 Other studies
6. These beliefs are increasingly undermined by a growing literature that investigates
the relationship between formal and informal institutions, the role of social norms, etc. See
discussion infra Part III.
7. See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 1.
8. Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003); see
also Katharina Pistor et al., Law and Finance in Transition Economies, 8 ECON. TRANSITION
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have shown that the manner in which countries were colonized and
the type of institutions established by the colonizers have had a long-
term impact on the development of legal institutions, notwithstanding
subsequent reform efforts.9
The new wave of market-cum-legal reforms has been even
more disappointing. Across Latin America, market reform initiatives
have been followed by crisis and instability, with few signs of
sustainable growth. The most dramatic case of economic and legal
reforms, hailed as highly successful only ten years ago, is that of
Argentina. Similarly, liberalization efforts among the East Asian
tigers, largely inspired by the IMF and other international financial
institutions, have arguably exposed these highly successful countries
to the risks that materialized in the crises of 1997 and 1998.1" Finally,
the extensive legal reforms conducted in transition economies over
the past decade have not produced the desired outcome, as evidenced
by the fact that many bemoan the lack of effective enforcement in the
region." These failures stand in sharp contrast to the developmental
successes achieved in some of the countries most openly defiant of
the new consensus, such as Malaysia in the aftermath of the financial
crisis in Asia, or China, which has pursued a gradual reform policy in
defiance of much of the conventional wisdom.
The net result is a lingering confusion over the appropriate
content and scope of market-oriented reform, including the reform of
legal institutions that are commonly associated with markets. At the
very least, the record implies the need to question the reigning ideas
surrounding legal reform. The importance of this subject is not solely
academic. At stake are billions of dollars that will be spent on efforts
to institute legal reform, and the hopes of hundreds of millions of
people trying desperately to catch up to living standards in the West.
325 (2000).
9. Daron Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An
Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001).
10. Some authors suggest that countries with "better" law on the books have been more
successful in weathering the crisis. See e.g., Simon Johnson et al., Corporate Governance in
the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-98, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 141 (2000). Others, however, contend
that the alleged dysfunctionality of domestic institutions in the affected countries reflected a
mismatch between liberalization policies and local institutional arrangement, not an inherent
weakness of these institutions.
11. For a critique of the "bad enforcement" argument, which redirects attention from
failed reform efforts, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Keynote Address: Whither Reform? Ten Years of
the Transition, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1999
27 (Boris Pleskovic & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2000).
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III. LEARNING FROM INVESTOR EXPERIENCE
In an effort to explore these issues, the authors of this Essay
convened a panel of practitioners to participate in a foreign
investment conference at Columbia Law School. Two ideas inspired
this initiative. First, we recognized that the outpouring of foreign
direct investment in recent years had extended to every country and
region of the world economy, not merely those most closely
following the favored policies of the new consensus. 2 Second, we
thought that practitioners directly engaged in the structuring and
management of foreign investment projects might have access to local
knowledge, which often escapes academics and policy makers.
The fact that investors operate in countries that do not perform
well on "rule of law" indices, 3 such as Russia, Vietnam or Indonesia
suggests that there is more to the story than that which recently has
been captured by the conventional "law matters" literature. There are
many possible explanations for why investors will choose to invest in
an environment with a weak legal infrastructure. The "why" is often
determined by resources, such as oil, that are not available elsewhere.
Other factors that motivate companies to invest are that the market
may be too big to ignore, as in China and Indonesia, or that the
companies' suppliers or buyers are already present in the market.
Even if the "why" is primarily determined by non-legal factors,
domestic institutions may play a role when deciding how to structure
an investment project or in attempting to secure a greater share of
future returns.
A further gap in the current understanding of investment
patterns arises from the lack of detailed case studies. To date, much
of the literature assembled considers only aggregate data and abstracts
from the very legal and institutional arrangements that seemed to us
crucial to understand. Given this lack of useful data, new insights
likely could be drawn from the experiences of practical people
engaged in real-world investment projects located in countries at the
forefront of market reform. How do diverse legal and institutional
settings impinge upon the process of foreign investment? Conversely,
how do foreign investors respond to these various settings once they
12. Among developing countries, China has been the leading recipient of foreign direct
investment in the past ten years. See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 87
(2003), available at http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/gdf2003; see also the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2002.
13. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2002, (Aug. 28,
2002) at http://www.transparency.org. This index uses a 1-10 scale where higher numbers
denote less corruption; Russia scores 2.7, Vietnam 2.4, and Indonesia 1.9.
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have made the decision to invest in a market? This information is not
available from studies that use aggregate data to analyze the statistical
relationship between foreign direct investment flows and other
factors.
To address these issues, six speakers with different regional
expertise were invited as panelists. The speakers specialized in the
following regions: Latin America, the Middle East and Africa, the
former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet
Union. They also represented different industry sectors, including
pharmaceuticals, oil, infrastructure projects, media, and food. 4 Most,
but not all, of the panelists were lawyers by profession. Some were
in-house counsels, while others worked as external legal advisors to
companies. While by no means representative in a technical sense,
the group was sufficiently diverse to avoid highly biased results.
The panelists received a broad checklist of the types of
questions that would be raised during the discussion. These questions
clustered around three themes:
(1) Strategic decisions and local institutions-i.e., analyzing
how domestic institutions shape the decision to invest or
not to invest; 5
(2) Adapting and using local institutions after the fact-i.e.,
seeking answers to the role domestic legal institutions
play once investors have made the decision to invest and
are on the ground;'
6
(3) Globalization and diversity-i.e., trying to understand
how the experience of investing in different
14. We would like to thank Kay Boulware-Miller, Mary Rose Brusewitz, Andr6 Madec,
Mark Mansur, Elena Popovic, and Dan Price for their participation and for sharing their
experience with us.
15. The following broad questions were included in this section: (1) Are concerns about
legal institutions in the host country ever a defining feature when making investment
decisions? (2) What weight do law and legal institutions carry in determining the decision of
foreign investors (your firm or your clients) to enter a particular market? (3) What aspects of
the local legal institutions are particularly relevant when making investment decisions? (4)
How important are bilateral or multilateral investment treaties in mitigating any concerns
about local legal institutions that you/your firm might have?
16. The following broad questions were included in this section: (1) Once a firm has
made the decision to invest in a particular host country, how do domestic legal institutions in
the host country determine the shape and scope of the investment? (2) How important are
law and legal institutions as compared to other factors, such as political and economic
stability? (3) Could you give examples of host country features (broadly defined) that have
called for major adaptations of your original business strategy? (4) What have you found
particularly useful in familiarizing yourself with the investment environment in a host
country? (5) What have you found particularly useful in improving the investment climate
for your firm or firms you have represented?
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environments has influenced the learning process of
investors and may have shaped future investment
strategies elsewhere. 'I
The questions were neither meant to bias the panelists nor to
confine their comments to themes that interest only academics.
Instead, the agenda sought to channel discussion to a broad purpose
and to provide the practitioners with a roadmap connecting their own
extensive experience to the topics of greatest concern to citizens,
politicians, and legal academics.
Over the course of three hours of debate, the panel engaged in
a wide-ranging discussion of the nature and variety of local legal
institutions and their influence (or lack thereof) on the structuring and
operation of foreign investment projects. In reflecting on their own
experiences, the panelists did more than respond to the questions.
They also introduced a new perspective on legal reform and on the
complex relations among local institutions, foreign investment, and
national projects of growth and development.
The remainder of this Essay describes the outcomes of the
panel. The next Part summarizes five leading themes that emerged in
the course of the conversation. The final Part suggests an agenda for
further research based on an interpretation of these findings.
IV. LESSONS FROM THE PRACTITIONERS' PANEL
Five major lessons emerged from the discussion with the
panelists, each of which is discussed below.
A. The Conventional Program of Legal Reform Is Not a
Prerequisite to Foreign Direct Investment in Developing
Countries
One of the pillars of the new consensus states that the rule of
law, as it is conventionally understood, is both necessary and essential
17. The following broad questions were included in this section: (1) Have you had any
experience with novel legal or business forms in developing or transitional markets? Please
give examples. (2) Has experience with novel institutional arrangements changed the way
you evaluate or approach new foreign investment opportunities? (3) Considering the
different countries your/your client's firm invests in, how similar or diverse are your business
strategies in each of these countries? (4) What efforts is your/your client's firm making in
reducing institutional diversity, which may result in higher transaction costs? (5) How
effective have these measures been?
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to the process of foreign direct investment. But, as panelist after
panelist affirmed, this element of conventional wisdom is true only in
the most general, and hence trivial, sense. It is true in the sense that
law, order, and regulation are better than chaos and crisis. It is
certainly not true if taken to mean that a specific series of "rules of
law," such as those identified and promoted as part of the Washington
Consensus development program, is a prerequisite for investment.
To begin, law plays a minor role in the initial decision to enter
a market. Why do foreign companies enter new markets? Although
legal considerations may weigh heavily once a strategic decision is
taken, legal concerns are not themselves the driving force in the initial
calculation. Instead, other factors play a greater role, such as the
importance of access to raw materials, the size and scope of the
foreign market, or the geographical position of the target country in
relation to other important markets.
If law, as a determinant of investment, plays only a minor role
in the formulation of strategic initiatives, does it gain prominence
once a strategic decision is taken and a project has been approved
internally on non-legal grounds? The panelists also agreed on this
point, but the position that they affirmed was distinctly at odds with
conventional assumptions. Law, the panelists agreed, clearly played a
crucial role in the structuring of an investment project, but no single
set of laws or arrangements followed naturally from this concern.
Instead, the kinds of laws that mattered varied from sector to sector
and depended on the details of the particular investment project.
Consider a few case studies contributed by panel members.
For the project finance attorney involved in a large-scale energy or
construction project, local legal and regulatory arrangements were
crucially important at every phase. The setting of basic tariffs, the
dollar-indexing of local contracts, and the granting of access to import
licenses and currency guarantees were important considerations in the
structure of a project. Moreover, the nature and breadth of the
interests involved meant that owners and managers needed to engage
in a continuous process of dialogue and negotiation with municipal
authorities, local suppliers, community groups, and business partners.
No fixed set of legal entitlements could guarantee the economic
conditions for the project's success or the goodwill or social
acceptance required for both the project and the country to move
forward.
However, the same assumptions may not hold true for other
kinds of investment projects, such as the provision of a cross-border
loan to a local bank, the formation of a licensing agreement, or the
pursuit of a vulture investment in a pool of securities trading at a
2003]
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steep discount in the local market. In contrast to the energy project,
these forms of investment present different issues, involve different
relationships, and require different legal entitlements and support.
For example, the bank loan raises questions about the nature of a
country's currency regime and the part of its legal system that
governs the enforcement of security interests. But it need not
otherwise impinge on any vital social concerns, such as the interests
of the local citizenry in securing access to affordable energy supplies
or the interests of the local government in ensuring the development
of municipal services.
As the preceding examples suggest, the concept that legal
protection is required to support foreign projects is itself far too open-
ended to generate a determinate model of legal reform. There is no
direct correlation between foreign direct investment and the kinds of
detailed legal arrangements that comprise a contemporary system of
corporate or financial law. Instead, the question must be approached
in a different way, through the examination of particular kinds of
investment projects, the interests they raise, and the variety of legal
forms and regulatory approaches available to support them.
The lesson may be generalized. The form and content of
useful law will not only depend on the details of the project and the
setting, but also on the particular strategy of institutional reform and
the program of economic development adopted in a particular
country. For example, a neo-liberal program of privatization will
require one set of legal reforms, while a commitment to a more
radically democratic form of market economy will require a different
approach.
Two main implications flow from this set of examples. First,
the question of what law matters cannot be answered in the abstract.
Instead, the question can only be addressed if it is divided into several
specific questions about the nature of the investment project, the
setting in which it occurs, and the kind of development strategy
pursued in a given country. Conversely, the justification of any
particular set of legal reforms-whether or not intended to support the
growth of foreign investment-must be viewed and evaluated in the
context of a historically-specific development program, which is itself
worthy of support.
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B. The Conventional Program of Legal Reform and the Kind of
Investment Associated with it May Be Detrimental to the
Promotion of Growth and Development in Developing
Countries
A second lesson flows directly from the first. While the
panelists unanimously affirmed the priority of strategic considerations
over conventional legal reforms, they were skeptical of the
developmental claims traditionally associated with foreign direct
investment. According to the new consensus, the new "best practice"
legal reforms are both good in themselves and necessary as part of the
larger project of market-oriented reform. Without good law or
markets, economic development is itself imperiled, as foreign
investors are held back from projects redounding to everyone's
interests. The net result could only be characterized as a "lose-lose"
situation in which the failure of conventional law reform retards the
normal progress of global access, foreign transfers, and new
technology, which are desperately needed in developing countries.
This line of thinking, however, seems to rest on a false
assumption about the nature of foreign investment and its contribution
to the development process. The rhetoric generally assumes that all
forms of foreign investment are equally valuable and equally
supported in the conventional framework of legal "best practices."
However, as the earlier discussion suggested, the conventional view
of investor protection is neither neutral among development paths nor
uniformly good for growth and development. The panelists
repeatedly stated that many of the most celebrated projects associated
with the new reforms were also colossal failures. The most prominent
example, which is discussed below, is the case of Argentina. Russia
provides another example, where large-scale legal reforms have not
produced the desired results. 8 Both the frequency and significance of
failure-and the existence of unexplained success, in particular the
impressive economic growth of China and more recently Vietnam and
India-cast doubt on the conventional arguments made for the new
reforms.
The challenge to the standard model manifests itself in many
ways. First, there was a general skepticism among the panelists
towards the neutrality of the orthodox model of investor protection.
Similarly, the challenge was evidenced by the general anxiety about
domestic constituencies left behind as foreigners pursued their
18. For a detailed analysis of the impact of legal reforms on financial market
development in transition economies, see Pistor et al., supra note 8.
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prerogatives with little input from local stakeholders or community
organizations. Lastly, it was reflected in the concern expressed by
some that the basic program of legal reform was of dubious value to
local development and the initiatives most critical to it. Instead, many
of the elements associated with the orthodox program of market
reform were dismissed as favorable to foreign investors alone, rather
than to local development.
Perhaps the most striking example of the failure of
conventional reforms to promote sustainable economic development
came in the course of a brief discussion of the Argentine privatization
program. In the early 1990s, Argentina pursued a wide-ranging
program of market-oriented reform, setting the standard for Latin
America, in particular, and developing countries, in general. As one
panelist reminded us, the country followed every precept of the new
consensus. The financial markets were liberalized. State-owned
companies were reorganized and sold through public tender. New
codes of financial law and practice were established to aid new
investment. Even the currency and cross-border investment regime
established a model code of legal practice. Through the now defunct
convertibility law, foreign purchases of peso assets and investments in
local ventures could attract the same market confidence as an
investment anywhere in the world. For a while at least, peso and
dollar asset valuations could be treated with equal confidence.
Foreigners were free to invest their dollars, and Argentina was the
proud recipient of massive inflows of foreign capital.
Despite this exemplary program of institutional reform, the
new Argentine economy and financial system proved to be anything
but exemplary in practice.19 The privatization of formerly state-
owned enterprises introduced new sources of conflict and instability
into the provision of basic services. Growth and efficiency gains
were often far below agreed-upon targets. The reforms had been put
in place to attract foreign involvement. However, to the dismay of
local stakeholders and municipal authorities, the foreigners who came
and the enterprises they developed fell short on a number of grounds.
Much has been made of the financial crisis to which Argentina
would eventually succumb. This crisis clearly affected foreign
investment projects. In the case of the larger projects, foreigners
quickly found themselves with rights of uncertain value. Local
19. Leslie Elliott Armijo, Menem's Mania?: The Timing of Privatization in Argentina,
1 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 1 (1994). On the failure of the Argentine model of reform more
generally, see Dani Rodrik, Trade Rout: Reform in Argentina, Take Two, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Jan. 14, 2002, at 13.
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services were in disarray. Tariffs, which previously had been granted
as a benefit to induce investment, came into conflict with changing
markets and the people affected by them. In addition, the very
mechanisms through which foreign investment was granted also
became roadblocks in the path of adjustment. Utility rates cast in
stone became targets of popular anger, with politically-granted
concessions undermining the prospects for further debate and the
give-and-take required to ensure smooth functioning under conditions
of economic uncertainty and increasing social disarray.
At the same time, new forms of investment began to emerge
alongside the traditional projects. While the Argentine infrastructure
projects floundered, a new generation of local initiatives, involving
unorthodox financial arrangements and property rights, developed in
the shadows of the traditional foreign investment projects. These
more versatile community experiments stood in sharp contrast to the
paradigm of foreign investment provided-and increasingly
contested-under the aegis of market orthodoxy. Projects, such as the
provincial energy cooperative which was organized on the outskirts of
Buenos Aires, began to suggest an alternative approach to both law
and foreign investment.
Three lessons stand out from this brief discussion of
privatization and foreign investment. First, the conventional program
of market reform has failed to provide the basis for stable, inclusive,
and sustainable growth required by developing countries. Second, to
a large extent, this failure can be attributed to a naive belief in a
particular style of foreign investment and a limited understanding of
the institutions necessary to support foreign investment and ensure
domestic gains from such undertakings. Third, notwithstanding the
defects of the traditional program of economic and legal reform,
countries were resilient. Left to their own devices, local groups and
financial entrepreneurs could occasionally invent new forms of
investment, navigate the local context, and channel resources to areas
of commercial potential and social need. Although these approaches
did not yet find sanction in the conventional categories of legal policy
or economic reform, their presence was felt in practice.
C. The State Plays a Crucial Role in the Promotion (or
Subversion) of Successful Investment Projects
The role of the state in economic development has been the
subject of dramatically changing views over the past several decades.
Proponents of the late development theory have long argued that the
2003]
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state plays a crucial role in promoting economic growth and
investment, particularly in late-developing countries. 20 Since the mid-
1980s, however, the role of the state has been downplayed in favor of
markets. The prevailing ideology of economic reforms in Latin
America and the post-socialist world has been "to get the state out."
As practitioners on the panel reminded us, this view is
potentially one-sided. In light of the failed reform efforts in the past,
the state has a key role to play in creating a favorable context for
foreign investment. Especially in the Developing World, the
government may need to act to promote socially beneficial investment
projects. The state may need to act not merely as the provider of legal
rules, but also as an economic agent in its own right, participating
actively in the control of enterprise or as an investor and strategic
partner in large-scale projects, involving both foreign and local
capital.
Legal practitioners on our panel had no difficulty citing a
variety of examples. Not all were benign-some cases suggested a
lingering bureaucratic interference. This tendency was especially true
in the former communist countries, where privatization had yet to
take hold. However, there were also instances of helpful state
involvement. Pharmaceutical companies needed to rely on the
cooperation of local regulators to import and distribute foreign goods.
Oil producers in Chad and elsewhere needed to rely on the state's
efforts to prepare the infrastructure and create a socially useful safety
net. Still other projects relied on a direct joint venture with the state.
Telecommunications projects in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil
depended on the state to retain control rights, provide tax and tariff
exemptions, and actively support and fund the development of local
systems.
How should the variety of government roles be interpreted?
For some on the panel, the participation of the state in the process of
production was always unfortunate. However, for others, the
aforementioned experiences elicited a different response. For these
panelists, the participation of the state in foreign investment projects
could provide a necessary and needed corrective to the work of
independent private agents. Perhaps the government should not be
confined to the roles of facilitator and legal provider. Perhaps it could
20. The late development theory was first formulated by Alexander Gerschenkron. See
ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 5(1962). It is reflected in the work of Amy Amsden, Robert Wade, and others. See ALICE H.
AMSDEN, ASIA'S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION (1989); ROBERT
WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN
EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (1990).
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also serve in a broader capacity, reconciling the conditions of foreign
investment and the conditions of local development.
In the eyes of the legal practitioners at the Conference, there
are two competing visions of the role of government in foreign
investment. Under one view, the state should adhere to its traditional
function consistent with the ideology of conventional market reform.
However, under another view, the state could and should perform a
number of roles left open in the course of foreign investment. The
state could undertake these roles, neither as an arbitrary central
authority nor as usurper of private initiative, but rather as a partner in
the process of economic development, coordinating public and private
initiative, and enlisting foreign and local support.
It would be a mistake to take too much away from this initial
exchange of ideas. No single doctrine emerged, nor did we elicit one.
However, the stories and perspectives of the panel members
suggested a more general point. They suggested an openness and
willingness to experiment under diverse, sometimes awkward,
conditions. In this still unsettled mix of attitudes and ideas could be
found materials for a new hypothesis about the nature of economic
development and about the range of institutional practices that might
contribute to investment and growth.
D. Local Partners May Be Equally Important for the Success or
Failure of Investment Projects
Local partners, like the state, have emerged as a crucial
determinant of the success or failure of foreign investment. The
panelists repeatedly emphasized the importance of this theme. Local
partners were not merely agents of an imperfect foreign consortium.
In many situations, they served to complement and extend the reach
of the foreign investors, connecting them to their social context and
the web of government, community, and commercial ties that
comprised it.
Again, no single impression defined the nature of this
partnership. In some cases, local partners provided access and local
presence, allowing companies to operate in distant markets and in
ways they could never manage on their own. But other cases were
less clear. For example, in the case of a media investment project
undertaken in one of Europe's emerging markets, a panelist affirmed
the project's utter dependence on the marshalling of local resources
and business partners. In countries lacking fundamental legal
institutions, local partners could compensate for the deficiencies in
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the law. They could do so, not through bribes or legislation, but
rather through informal sources of influence and control, thereby
opening channels of public access and information.
For the media project referred to above, the local partner was
important because of the political character of the investment project
and the inadequacy of existing legal and institutional arrangements in
securing and promoting the project. Local partners were key
contributors to the success of the media venture because only they
could secure the conditions for a high-profile, politically-sensitive
investment project in a country with poorly defined and inadequately
enforced political and economic entitlements.
Two general insights are implied by this brief discussion.
First, there neither is nor should be a rigid divide between foreign and
local investment. Second, there is a need for a different kind of
support in law and institutional arrangements. If foreign investment
is to be enhanced and strengthened through a connection with local
partners, the conception of a legal framework that supports
development must also change. The appropriate legal and
institutional setting must include something more than the classical
property norms. It must also include legal rules and arrangements
capable of informing a broad range of investment forms, including
mixed public-private ventures in areas of strategic importance to the
local economy and development project.
E. The Recent Experience of Developing Countries with the
Conventional Program of Legal and Institutional Reform
Suggests the Need To Identify and Conceptualize Alternative
Programs of Foreign Investment and Alternative Approaches
to Globalization
Considered separately, the themes outlined above need not
imply a general criticism of the prevailing model of reform.
However, viewing these themes together leads to the emergence of a
different perspective and a different program of legal reform.
According to the orthodox approach described at the outset, a
series of legal and institutional reforms are required to support the
transition to market-oriented economies. These markets, in turn, are
necessary to support growth and economic development. Since
foreign direct investment forms a crucial part of this development
agenda, foreign investor protections of the kind associated with
"global best practice" become synonymous with legal reform and the
market economy.
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Few of the panelists questioned the continuing validity of this
conception. The panelists affirmed the need to enforce law and order,
to guard against rampant corruption, and to secure basic property
rights and contractual obligations. The regime that governed foreign
investment on the basis of these norms was more or less taken for
granted. Few practitioners (or members of the audience) questioned
the power or utility of the standard approach to foreign investment or
its legal and institutional foundations.
However, a different perspective appeared when the panelists
discussed their practical experiences. From the many stories drawn
from practice, an understanding emerged that was critical of and
suggested alternatives to the conventional wisdom. Before further
describing elements of this understanding, it may be helpful to return
to two examples mentioned above.
In the earlier discussion of the failed reforms in Argentina, the
panelists emphasized that the "one-size-fits-all" model of legal reform
was tried and found wanting. The defects with this model included
excessive deference to foreign investors, unfair distribution of rights
and privileges, and inadequate attention to local context and public
interest. More importantly, critics voiced concern about the model of
development based on the orthodox program of privatization.
Although characterized in the literature as economically and
financially sound, the model was rigid and prone to crisis, with
uncertain value for foreign investors and uncertain benefit for
Argentina. Even if the panelists were generally skeptical of the value
of institutional orthodoxy, they did not rule out the prospect of
institutional reform. On the contrary, the panelists seemed genuinely
comfortable that alternatives provided in practice could occasionally
solve problems left unsolved by theory.
One approach that seems to have worked in practice is to build
upon local initiatives. Here again, the examples often varied on a
regional basis. In Argentina, the panelists noted the example of the
provincial energy cooperative, emerging in the shadows of the
orthodox program of privatization and foreign investment. In Russia,
Mexico, and even Chad, unorthodox partnerships between
government and the private sector, and between foreign and local
capital seemed critical to understanding the success of foreign
investment projects in those countries. The panelists also discussed
new varieties of legal and institutional form, which despite their
unorthodoxy seemed able to attract foreign capital and contribute to
local investment.
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V. AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
While the panel discussion produced many new insights, they
cannot be generalized without further research. The information and
inspiration gained from these discussions can, however, shape future
research agendas on the role of law and legal institutions for foreign
investment.
First, the panelists have repeatedly stressed that when
analyzing foreign investment, it is crucial to differentiate among the
different forms foreign investment may take. The topic of the
conference and the panel was foreign direct investment, which is only
a small subset of foreign investment activities. Foreign direct
investment is typically defined as direct investment in productive
assets by a company incorporated in a different jurisdiction.
However, foreign investment activities may also include portfolio
investment, which is typically contrasted with foreign direct
investment. In addition, other forms of financial investment, such as
insurance banking or project finance, are distinct from foreign direct
investment.
The reason for these distinctions is that each of these forms
makes different demands on local institutions and on different aspects
of host country institutions. For better or worse, some forms of
foreign investment can be better insulated from local institutions by
using substitutes, such as contracts based on foreign law, and
international arbitration as opposed to local courts, while others
require a much more supportive domestic environment.
It is also important to differentiate between investments in
different sectors of the economy. For example, producing or
disseminating pharmaceuticals in different countries creates different
challenges for protecting intellectual property rights than does oil
exploration. While these points may seem trivial, it is important to
recognize that many of the empirical studies that explore the role of
legal institutions in foreign investment rely on international capital
flows, which conflate different forms of investments in different
sectors.2 1 Recent research on international trade flows suggests that
the relevance of domestic legal institutions for trade flows differs for
different classes of goods. Differentiating between simple goods
(mostly commodities) and complex goods, a distinction common
among trade economists, Daniel Berkowitz, Johannes Moenius, and
Katharina Pistor present evidence which suggests that domestic
21. See the studies referred to in supra note 3.
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institutions matter primarily for complex goods and especially for
exporter countries. 22  The reason is that complex goods are more
vulnerable to legal disputes. Furthermore, importers who discover
problems with goods may have to use domestic legal institutions in
the exporter's country to execute a court verdict or arbitration award
if the exporter refuses to comply with the ruling. This reliance on the
legal institutions in the exporter's country may arise even if the
verdict or award were obtained elsewhere. Similarly, one may expect
more nuanced results on the relevance of domestic legal institutions
when differentiating among different forms of foreign investment
within different sectors.
Second, the analysis of the institutional environment
surrounding foreign investment should become both more specific
and broader, and should capture formal and informal institutions. As
discussed above, the institutional indicators currently used in
empirical studies only capture whether a system is or is not
dysfunctional. They do not identify specific institutions that are
dysfunctional, such as the courts, the state administration, or central
versus local institutions, much less what problems these specific
institutions might have. Such problems may include political
interference, lack of resources, capacity problems, corruption,
regulatory capture, organizational problems (e.g., a lack of filing
systems), or a general mistrust in the court system, which may be a
function of any of the variables just mentioned or a lasting historical
legacy.23  Anyone attempting to analyze the proper causes of
malfunctioning institutions, to give policy advice, or to analyze the
feasibility of substituting or complementing ill-functioning
institutions with alternative arrangements will first need to determine
the actual cause of the observed problem.
In addition, the analysis should be broadened to include semi-
or informal institutional arrangements, including contractual
arrangements, private-public partnerships, and unilateral, bilateral,
and multilateral monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.24 Closer
22. See Daniel Berkowitz et al., Trade, Law and Product Complexity (Feb.
2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Columbia Journal of Transnational Law,
also available at http://ssm.com/abstract=315969).
23. On the difficulties the new Russian commercial courts faced to overcome this
legacy, see Katharina Pistor, Supply and Demand Jbr Contract Enforcement in Russia:
Courts, Arbitration, and Private Enforcement, 22 REv. CENT. E. EUR. L. 55 (1996).
24. For the distinction between unilateral, bilateral and multilateral enforcement
mechanisms, see Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and The State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 5 (1985); Paul H. Rubin, Growing a Legal System in the Post-Communist
Economies, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1994).
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inspection of the functioning of developed legal systems, such as that
of the United States, has revealed that law is but one governance
mechanism among many, for traders and businessmen alike. In a
study published in the early 1960s, Stewart Macaulay showed that
local businesspeople in Wisconsin used the legal system only as a last
resort and first tried to resolve disputes by informal means.25 More
recent studies lend support to these findings. Lisa Bernstein, for
example, has provided evidence that entire sectors, such as diamond
traders, may deliberately opt out of the existing formal legal system
and develop their own set of institutions to govern transactions and
resolve disputes. 6 And Robert Ellickson has shown that disputes are
often resolved in ways that differ substantially from the solutions
provided by formal law.27 While it may be the case that some of these
arrangements operate only in the shadow of effective law
28enforcement by the state, it may also be true that absent informal
support, formal institutions cannot function properly. In fact, the
panel discussions suggest that over-reliance on the appearance of
functioning formal institutions and a lack of appreciation for informal
institutions and a broader set of investment relations with different
constituencies in the host country may undermine the success of an
investment project.
Third, greater emphasis should be placed on the role and
identity of local partners in an investment project. At the most basic
level, it may be important to distinguish between private parties, such
as contractual parties or third-party guarantors, and state parties as
partners in a joint venture. In addition, others who are not a party to
the investment agreement may serve important functions as local
partners. These parties may be the local government, local
investment community, local lawyers, or community organizations.
Their support or rejection of projects, especially large-scale projects
in infrastructure (e.g., tollways, energy projects) or exploration, is
likely to have important implications for the success of a project in
the medium- and long-term.
Fourth, one should differentiate between the private and social
benefits of the investment project as well as between the legal and
25. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 55 (1963).
26. Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
27. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991) (discussing dispute resolution among cattle farmers in California).
28. David Chamy, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 Harv. L. Rev.
373 (1990).
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non-legal arrangements that may form part of the foreign investment
deal. While investors clearly want to reap private benefits from
investment projects, investments in socially relevant sectors,
including infrastructure, power, and natural resource exploration, will
need to take into account community interests to be sustainable.
Regarding the choice of legal or non-legal arrangements, project-
specific support, such as a guarantee by the government in the host
country or by an international financial institution like the
International Finance Corporation ("IFC"), may make a particular
project viable and ensure that the parties can reap private benefits
from it. However, these benefits may come at the expense of the
legitimacy of the investment projects, which may require a broader
consensus. Conversely, general laws that may have been adopted in a
democratic fashion to benefit the social good may be used by a few
powerful interest groups and create disproportionate private benefits
at the expense of the general public. Without some analysis of the
political economy of the host country and of its interaction with the
investment community, it will be difficult to determine who benefits
most from different institutional arrangements.
Fifth, context matters. Not every legal institution that works
well in the United States will work in Chad, India, or Colombia, nor
would institutional arrangements that work in these countries
necessarily survive in the United States. What may appear to be an
inefficient solution to a well-known contractual problem may be an
efficient adaptation in light of other existing constraints, which the
parties cannot alter. Thus, it may be futile to try to develop "best
practice norms" or "codes of conduct" aimed at covering a variety of
investment projects in many different countries. Investors and their
local partners face different constraints in different countries. Not all
of these differences are unique. Nevertheless, the variations, both in
the constraints presented and opportunities offered by different
countries, suggest that generalizations may be of limited use.
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